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The Question of the 'Civil State':
An Arab Public Policy roundtable discussion in light of the Arab Uprisings

Introduction

On September 4, 2012, the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs (IFI) at the American University of Beirut (AUB) convened a roundtable discussion on the 'Civil State'. A highly topical subject due to recent Arab uprisings, IFI and the participants hoped that ideas tabled during the discussion would generate further research and working papers. It was also hoped that the discussion could provide the inspiration for a more comprehensive Arab conference. This could, in turn, provide an important regional platform for critical thinking and progressive argument with which reforms could be sought. All present at the roundtable shared the intention to drive this new era of Arab aspiration forward and to be sensitive to current political, social and cultural needs.

Fifteen people were invited to participate, comprising mostly of AUB Professors and staff as well as intellectuals from the region with an interest in public affairs. Not all were able to attend. The eight participants who took part in the roundtable were:

Imad Al Hout (Member of the Lebanese Parliament and the Islamic Group Al Jamaa Al Islamiya)
Saoud Al Mawla (Professor of Political Science, Sociology and Islamic and Christian Studies, and a founding member of the Arab Group for Christian-Muslim Dialogue)
Radwan Al Sayyed (Writer, Professor of Islamic Studies at the Lebanese University and Editor-in-Chief of the Jurisprudence Review**,** *Al Ijtihad*)
Adnan Abou Awde (former Jordanian Minister of Information)
Charles Harb (Professor of Psychology at AUB)
Rami Khouri (Journalist and Director of Issam Fares Institute at AUB)
Adib Nehme (Regional Advisor on Social Statistics at the ESCWA),

Acting as Moderator:
Tarek Mitri (former Lebanese Minister, an academic, and Senior Research Fellow at the Issam Fares Institute).

Unravelling the term 'Civil State'

The discussion opened with an examination of the term 'civil state', both historical and current. Despite obvious ambiguities surrounding its definition the term has been widely applied across political, religious and popular discourse of the Arab Spring (often overlapping with the term 'secular state'.) Newly emerging Islamic forces on the post-revolution political scene have had a tendency to use the term and the roundtable participants posited the notion that this new ruling class is increasingly guilty of manipulating the term in order to organize themselves and garner support for governance.

Participants drew attention to the relevance of the public policy mechanisms chosen by several Arab countries where this trend is apparent.

It was suggested that contemporary political Islam no longer appears to expressly oppose the idea of a 'civil state', however the issue is complicated by attempts to redefine and incorporate the term into an Islamic political discourse as evidenced by events following the revolution in Tunisia (December 2010).

It was argued that Islamic political groups have been waiting to grasp their 'chance' for power and although often criticized for not moving quickly toward these goals in the past, it would seem that the political paradigm has shifted in the interim. This new Islamic ruling class has gained many opponents and is challenged by concerned citizens who have taken to the streets to fight against oppression and corruption and in opposition to the Islamic political parties. So while the term 'civil state' is not uncommon in the region, the proponents of the term and the motives behind its employment are changing along with the victims of its misuse. Remarkably, 'civil state' is now used in both dissident and loyalist camps and thus participants expressed the need to urgently engage in a critical examination of the term.

There are enormous challenges attached to establishing political institutions and measuring their impact in terms of their nature, role and key functions; as well as how the state approaches its citizens, such as in the way it tackles minority issues, for example. It was felt that during this time of post-revolution state reformation, where the term 'civil state' is being applied and will have significant impact in the future, one must seek clarity on its true meaning.

Note: Participants agreed that it would be useful to continue this discussion within formulated themes. Because of the recent ambiguity and the lack of supporting literature, such themes could be used by IFI and other research institutes for further studies.

Tracing the origins of the 'Civil State'

- Mohammad Mehdi Shameseddine

It was posited that the term 'civil state' emerged in the region during the latter half of the twentieth century. Lebanese Shiite scholar Mohammad Mehdi Shameseddine began to examine the concept during the 1980s in the wake of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's 1970s lectures on the idea of guardianship as rule. Often referred to as 'Rule by the Jurisprudent' or 'Rule of the Islamic Jurist', under Khomeini's theory Islam gives a Faq h (Islamic jurist) custodianship over people. The Faqih or Vali-ye Faqih (Guardian Jurist) serves as the Supreme Leader of the government. This was later enshrined in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Shameseddine's initial examination of the idea of the civil state was not to challenge the 'Guardianship of the Jurist' system. His interested was in the position of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt at that time.

The Muslim Brotherhood had begun to consider the Sharia compliant state that they sought to establish as a so-called 'civil state'. Unlike the model followed by the Vatican,

their state would not offer unaccountable leadership to an infallible figurehead like the Pope. Sharia Law with its deep foundations in jurisprudence was seen to imply a level of compatibility with the theory of a political civil authority.

Shameseddine defined his idea of the civil state as 'the guardianship of the nation on itself'. He spoke of two equal and independent sanctities: that of the Nation and that of religion that did not pose threats to or interfere with each other. The legitimacy of the nation stems from the people while the legitimacy of religion stems only from God's word as formulated in sacred text. He argued that even though religion has a role in social affairs, the nation and its legitimacy remains firmly in the hands of the people, proving its compatibility with the notion of a 'civil state'.

- Egypt

The roundtable discussion turned to the Egyptian elections and the participation of the Muslim Brotherhood. A number of points were tabled and further discussion stemmed from some of them below.

- Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution stipulates that Sharia Law be the source of all legislation. In the post-revolution referendum, this detail was never subjected to adequate review and critical consideration.

- During the People's Assembly and Shura Council Elections the slogan 'Islam is the Solution' emerged. In Egyptian society it was suspected that is was a reflex against the rising threats posed to the identity of Islam and also as a means to regain legitimacy and votes.

Participants commented on the political treatment of post-revolution Prime Minister Kamal Al Janzouri. After agreeing to an external loan from the region, the Muslim Brotherhood publicly accused Al Janzouri of acting as an 'infidel', yet the Muslim Brotherhood subsequently demanded $4.8 billion from the International Monetary Fund. Justified as 'better than taking Saudi and Qatari money', it was suggested that they may be publicly appeasing the international community while attempting to maintain Sharia as a tool for political gain especially useful at election times.

Post-revolution Egypt has been described as 'a national, constitutional, democratic and modern state'. The Muslim Brotherhood had initially viewed the phrase with contempt until Mohammad Morsi's victory in the presidential elections. Participants noted this as a turning point in the Brotherhood's position. Now apparently such a description is no longer seen in contradiction to the Islamic authority of the State. It would appear that the notion of the 'civil state' has been accepted intentionally. Taking advantage of the ambiguity surrounding its definition, it may be serving as a useful political tool when communicating with the masses.

Participants commented that not only the Muslim Brotherhood, but also the Salafis and perhaps others seem willing to use religion in their struggle for power. They perceived this manipulation of the faith as leading 'to the fragmentation of the society on a fanatic basis'. Prevalent among the Muslim Brotherhood, Jihadi fundamentalists, Liberals and Salafis 'every group tells the public that his Islam is better than that of its competitors'.

- Mustafa Al Sibai:

It was suggested that it is critical to distinguish between the various faces of political Islam present and emerging in the region. In this context attention was drawn to the different approach adopted by the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria. Mustafa Al Sibai, co-founder of the Syrian movement has long considered the term 'civil state' from a more typical secularist approach, to be understood as a means to protect diversity and achieve equality between citizens. This historically secularist approach begs the question - does the Syrian Brotherhood understand a 'civil state' to be a secular state? In which case we should also examine how secularists approach the term. Do secularists perceive Al Sibai's definition in line with their own? Or perhaps this hypothesis is simply an after-effect of French influence on Syrian political theory?

Note: Some participants considered the distinction between firm secularists and proponents of the civil state as outside the remit of the discussion.

A thought on the 'Post-Colonial era Middle East'

Participants went on to discuss the influence of colonization in State formation throughout the Middle East. Post World War II, after Great Britain and France imposed their divisions across the Middle East territories, the resulting states bore significant resemblance, institutionally and otherwise, to those of their former colonizers: models of kingdoms, republics, councils of elders (similar to the British House of Lords) and commons (similar to parliaments) with multiple political parties emerged.

From the late 1940s until early 1950s and with the exception of Palestine, greater levels of political autonomy and pluralism developed across the region. Independent Arab states adopted European style political systems that were soon put to an end with a series of military coups d'état, giving way to the phenomenon of single-party regimes. Such regimes functioned as an extension of the executive authority.
It was argued that this resulted in the dangerous phenomenon where although parliaments remained, political parties and opposition disappeared within.

With no opposition or political parties to choose from, how do citizens practice democracy in electing parliamentary representatives? Participants noted the emergence of tribal and clan based tendencies in regional politics and how political pluralism was soon replaced by variety in religious parties. In this sense, religion emerged from the mosques to be used as a political tool and electoral booster. It was also suggested that following military coups, 'Western' concepts such as the Rule of Law disappeared in the Arab World. Such concepts had promoted rationality through their pragmatic, scientific approach. With their loss the parliaments became spaces to empower religion and clans, as evidenced in Jordan.

In light of these events, some participants suggested that religion should be reinterpreted based on modern human sciences, such as psychology and anthropology and distanced from medieval interpretations.

Interpretations of the term 'civil state'

A number of related points were discussed.

Some participants shared their views on the definition of the term while others contributed country specific observations and further scholarly references noted below:

- In Egypt the term 'civil state' has proven culturally problematic. It is often considered as a 'Western concept' and thus, in-depth critique can provoke accusations of 'anti-Western' rhetoric.

- The role of the Imam and how religious speeches contribute to a climate of fear with the Imam becoming a partner to recent tyranny, whether consciously or not.
During their speeches, Imams encourage their followers to let God handle their problems. By applying this rationale, participants noted how the individual is removed from the simple role of the 'oppressed' who must face the oppressor alone. Instead, it was suggested he now becomes a 'victim' awaiting 'charity' at the hands of God. If Islam is founded on the principles of incentive and coercion, some participants queried the coercive role of the Imam.

- Hassan Al Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, was cited for his letter 'Principles of Governance'. In it the famous Imam considers the parliamentary system as a means to implement the rules of governance enunciated by Islam.

- 'Civil, Not Religious' (1994), a study of the concept of the Islamic State by Sheikh Mohammad Al Ghazali was also mentioned.

One participant moved to conclude that the Islamic State must be considered as a 'civil state'. Another referred to the contractual, constitutional system of rule evident from the social contract between the people and ruler (the latter being the employee of the former.) The same speaker also drew attention to the 'Madina Accord' as evidence of a level of decentralization in states of the region. In this sense, the Senate can be considered similar to a parliament where there is a group consulted by the ruler and representing the people.

This reference to the 'Madina Accord' was later criticized. The idea of citizenship being only 200 to 250 years old was not firmly established in the consciousness of the people at the time. Given that the progress of human sciences is gradual, it was considered preferable to maintain a political science lens for the purposes of this discussion.

Another participant commented on the separation of powers between Caliphate and King in the Islamic state. He added that the phenomenon of long, unchallenged periods of political leadership, commonplace in the region, are not a condition of rule enunciated by Islam, but more a part of Arab tradition. He stressed the fact that the Islamic state is 'founded on Institutions that bind the ruler. It is a state of law and not a state made for one person.'

Opinions were shared on the cases of Omar bin Al Khattab and Ali bin Abi Taleb. Participants argued that they had both adhered to the law. It was suggested that the Islamic forces had simply grasped their opportunity in light of military time wasting.

Another participant considered the idea of a modern civil state and its incompatibility with three state 'trends': the Nationalist, the Communist/Socialist and the Islamic. He argued that none of these models of political rule fitted with the concept of the civil state in that

they are driven by totalitarian regimes with undemocratic aspirations of maintaining power. He noted how Europe's successes with democracy were not by coincidence; but rather the result of adopted social, cultural, and economic policies. He warned of how we are often guilty of producing the systems and tools capable of preserving and protecting the ruler and not the system. When examining the 'Arab Spring' and conceptualizing the desired civil state, we must remember that revolutions acquire strong popularity in the beginning but that this popularity decreases with time if the requisite tools to institutionalize and preserve them are not available.

At this point, it was felt that without regard to the cultural context necessary in such debate, the discussion should not move further into theology. It was proposed to tackle the topic in a more pragmatic way. It was suggested that participants avoid resorting to any citation of Imams or prophets given that 'such sacred references would disrupt the dialogue'. The concept of a 'civil state' was considered to reside better in political and sociological fields.

However, participants thought it useful to flag the need for further study into the experience of Christian political parties in Lebanon. This may reveal that it is not exclusively Islam that poses a challenge to the civil state idea.

Revolutions and the Civil State

Participants considered the need to move the debate on the 'civil state' forward. As the debate continues and key concepts take time to formulate, we must be wary of developments taking place on the ground such as political uprisings with the potential to manipulate the term and its interpretations.

We have witnessed the emergence of authoritarian or theocratic states on many occasions. These have been based on various foundations: religion, Baathist ideology, communism and now on what Egyptian President Morsi and others present. A number of participants considered that the Arab Spring revolutions were spurred on by the employment of the term 'civil democratic state' (in Yemen, Egypt, and others). The argument goes that people did not take to the streets calling for Arab or Islamic unity and not even for the liberation of Palestine, a fact that is very indicative. The people voted for a 'modern, civil and democratic state'.

Some considered the above expression too general, suggestive of and directly lifted from the European model. Others responded drawing attention to the irony in Arab society's openness toward Western commercialism, while it remains very sceptical of ideas and concepts of a political or social nature. Some participants expressed doubts that recent revolutionary demands were exactly related to the concept 'civil state' especially in light of election results in Egypt and Tunisia. However they admitted it was too early to fully judge new governments such as the Muslim Brotherhood. Finally some participants agreed that the slogan had been used on the streets with the primary motivation of protection. Without human rights and democracy, how could any civil state be protected?

Once again the roundtable developed into a political discussion. It was argued that Hosni Mubarak and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali had both headed totalitarian regimes which forced their respective state apparatuses to lose neutrality and objectivity. By merging

the political and administrative functions they had made their re-election possible. Some participants aired concerns over the new authorities, e.g. Al Nahda party in Tunisia, Mohammad Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and the new authority in Libya and how they posed the same threat of 'purifying' state apparatus. How new authorities are just as capable of appointing their 'own people' to state functions, removing challenges to their regime and guaranteeing a long legacy. Participants agreed that a more in-depth study of descriptive references should be undertaken, for example the Laws and Constitutions that are binding on people in these situations.

A number of Arab scholars were cited for their study of the relationship between religion and rationality, namely Mohammad Abdo (for the idea of the 'unity of the Islamic Nation') and Jamal Eddin Al Afghani. Distinction was made between their works and those of Hassan Al Banna who preferred to speak about the 'Islamic call' and 'caller' and avoided the term 'civil state'. This choice was related to protecting Islamic identity. The state as it existed at the time, even though headed by a King, was considered a 'State of Muslims'.

Participants once again cited Mohammad Mehdi Shameseddine for his moderate approach to religion. Mohammad Mehdi Shameseddine had examined western concepts and the social sciences while he also spoke of an Islamic commonwealth. When Lebanon descended into war (1980-1990) he focused on engaging parties in peaceful dialogue. He attempted to mediate between what was religious and civil. The issue of a secular state was already well under scrutiny in Lebanon before this critical juncture and so the question, could the civil state be a valid system to adopt, grew in importance.

One of the participants quoted Shameseddine in a seminar he had spoken at in southern Beirut where he had described the civil state as 'a religion-less state', adding that it is a neutral apparatus, contrary to Hegel's theory of its nature. Viewing the state as absolute and supreme had only produced fascism and Nazism in the past. When asked whether a civil state was thus a secular one too, he had replied: “Call it whatever you want, but secularism has acquired a certain philosophical background, a civil state means that the nation mandates itself, so if the nation does not want an Islamic state… so be it”.

With this in mind, what are 'the Arab experiences of a state'? Until now every Arab country from Yemen to Kuwait, Sudan, Somalia, Iraq, Lebanon and on has suffered crises of legitimacy and existential crises. The recent revolutions mark a new chapter in this history. They have instigated popular movements aimed at self-realization and ultimately an assumption of control based on the concept of citizenship. One participant also drew attention to other actors: corporations, civil society movements, even sports fans like the Egyptian Ultras, and ex-regime figureheads who are part of the growing political movements and who should not be forgotten in the discussion.

The Rise of the Islamic (civil) State

When Khomeini rose to power, the idea of an Islamic state gained momentum and shifted from a passive to active reality. From the Muslim Brotherhood's perspective, such developments had been set in motion during the nineties. It was during these years that Shameseddine had met with Rashed Al Ghannouchi and before long we had witnessed the dramatic 'rise' of municipal elections and preparations for further parliamentary elections. In 2003 a Muslim Brotherhood Group document recommended the formation of political parties such as 'Al-Nahda Party' and the 'Justice and Development Party'.

It was noted how Al-Nahda, the Tunisian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, had won their municipal elections. Shameseddine had tested the water at the time and suggested that if they took more than a 70 percent majority, they should offer 20 per cent of their seats back. The idea was that such a symbolic move would not only command wider and deeper representation of minorities in government but it would also do away with the fear-induced need to maintain large majorities and would promote a more tolerant and inclusive political space between religious and secularists alike.

When Hezbollah was being formed, Shameseddine recommended following in the footsteps of a number of Christian parties, who although belonging to a certain faith do not define themselves as religious parties. However, his suggestion was never followed and a religious Islamic party emerged.

Based on recent important events, attendees considered it necessary to shed light on and clarify these matters. This was seen as a matter of national interest as well as a means of preventing any further distrust among minorities or secularist elites. Political discourse of late is heavily influenced by the role of the Muslim Brotherhood and participants suggested that in tackling the political mechanisms in each state, more effort be made to distinguish between the formation of each national party and also more effort be made to defuse the environment of distrust between political opponents which, it was suggested, was similar to the fear-mongering experienced during the communist era.

Putting aside the theoretical debate for a moment, participants turned to another question. If Arab revolutions demand states of law, modernity and democracy, how can these demands be met? How do we define this state?

One participant suggested that emphasis should be less upon the state and the need to classify it and more on the interests of the people. People today are more aware of their own interests and one of their main fears lies in the role religion can play in shaping domestic, political life and particularly how it could be misused to promote violence and garner support. The pursuit of an 'Arab state' was again distinguished from that of a religious regime. Here, it was argued the peoples' interests are preserved.

Furthermore, it was said that the political elite must answer a critical question: how do we ensure that people abide by the new authority? What is required - is it religious discipline, integration of the rule of law or better political participation? Participants expressed the hope that societies would not be caught between two authoritarian regimes- religion and political/military - to achieve this end.

The pioneering young leaders of these revolutions started out with universal values. They demanded freedom and democracy through a movement that impressed the world. They brought tyranny to the world's attention. Participants agreed that although those newly elected should be given a chance, this should not last indefinitely as in the past. We should be open to new leadership but it is vital that they remain accountable to the people. If they fail during their term, the people should have the democratic means and mechanisms necessary to 'sound the alarm' on acts of tyranny or oppression and have the government replaced.

It was suggested that the IFI create a dedicated unit to critically monitor the use and role of religion in public affairs. Practical thinking is crucial. Institutions should be established

to monitor, write, publish and report on repression and dissent against new leaders particularly where protests are mounted by credible groups.

Identity and Legitimacy

At a recent conference held by Al Nahda, we witnessed the potential for harmony between Sharia law and basic human rights. The conference debated legal rights, and especially those for women. Interestingly many attendees at the conference had been open to the idea of this concept within their Islamic state. Rashed Al-Ghannushi, founder of 'al-Ittijah al-Islami' or the Islamic Tendency Movement was discussed as was his earlier experience in Tunisia during the 1980s. His Movement rose to power during this time, describing itself specifically as rooted in non-violent Islam and calling for a 'reconstruction of economic life on a more equitable basis, the end of single-party politics and the acceptance of political pluralism and democracy.' To the dismay of both the religious and secular community, Al-Ghannushi was imprisoned by the powers that be. He went into political exile for his views until the recent ousting of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. He returned to his homeland in January 2011 to chair the Al-Nahda Movement (considered Tunisia's branch of the Muslim Brotherhood). He has since put forward the idea that parliament is entitled to enact laws given that they will not pass laws contrary to 'Islamic traditions and identity'.

Participants moved the discussion to the ideas of identity, cultural relevance and legitimacy. They noted how the strict parameters of Sharia often clash with cultural realities when it comes to implementation. Although it is preferable to maintain harmony between both, it is important that in moving forward, these ideological/culture clashes are not dealt with militarily. As we have witnessed, this approach has only led to tyranny and the reactionary radicalization of Islamic forces. If conciliation is not achieved, such groups only develop a harder line to ensure that Sharia prevails.

With some religious sites having been attacked, participants also drew attention to how we should approach such acts. Military response has usually forced dissent underground and given further impetus to militant groups. Some participants suggested that the solution may lie in a combination of the use of force, dialogue and also encouraging dissidents out into open political spaces.

It was considered that if freedom of expression was enjoyed across the spectrum from liberals to Islamists, then perhaps not only would their stances change but at the very least all would engage in legitimate political debate. In matters of power transfer and new governance, the tools used during this sensitive transitional phase must be carefully examined. Again participants called for independent monitoring mechanisms, while the question of implementation of standards was also raised. The focus returned to Egypt and the recent dismissal of the heads of the army and the security. How should we perceive such actions? Is the new state slipping under the full control of the Muslim Brotherhood? Or are we finally witnessing graphic stages of reform necessary to move Egyptian politics forward?

At this point, one participant was keen to draw a distinction between identity and values in that although our societal values may be Islamic to a certain extent, our identity often varies, for example between Islamic and Arab. This identity-value conflict has been highly visible in the past. Furthermore, it was felt that the failure of pan-Arabism dealt a big blow to the region leaving behind it an ideological void. Thus it was vulnerable to

repressive regimes and incapable of supporting healthy partisan life. These factors have allowed Islamic ideology to develop and spread. Therefore when discussing civil or secular statehood, the speaker argued that we must ask - are these ideas relevant and do they fit within the context of our society and culture? Is the effort to adopt these an attempt to transfer outside ideologies, like with communism in the past? Perhaps we must produce ideas that are distanced from religious extremism and European secularism (like that in France or Germany). We must search for what brings us together as nations and how we can fulfil the needs of our current reality. He added that crucially we must not fall victim to the temptation of viewing Islam as a whole. We must consider its various faces and models, Egyptian, Turkish, Saudi, Talibani, Wahhabi, Iranian (political) and many more.

Upcoming Issues

With the particular dynamics that exist throughout the Arab World, what is the role of an Institution like the IFI in light of current events? And although defining the term 'civil state' is clearly important, another crucial question emerged from the roundtable: how does the 'civil state' relate to the people?

Participants agreed that their role henceforth is to study and document. They should try to define issues, terms and motives and to better understand the ideas expressed by individuals.

Elections may determine what the majority wants. Nevertheless, our objective should be to determine the significance of individual will and to discuss it with political activists. We should relate it the people's legitimacy and their motives for mass mobilization. For the first time in a long time, public opinion has influence on public life. Polls, in addition to deep discussions. can help us understand that. Analyzing and interpreting elections, in addition to their results and campaigns, remain important to expand public opinions.

All participants agreed that AUB enjoys a great degree of credibility and therefore it was suggested that the University take the lead in inviting individuals from relevant countries in the region to join in this effort. Discussions should continue in the coming months. These will provide insight into country specific issues and promote deeper understanding throughout the region. Perhaps defining the civil/secular state requires a better understanding of what people today mean when they use the term.

Participants agreed that the idea of an IFI-led monitoring project is interesting and worth developing.

The following areas of focus were flagged:

1) Monitor the ongoing discussion: what is being said about the 'civil state'?

2) If we assume that society demands a civil state and if we accept that the term remains unclear for now, we should monitor opinion polls to measure issues quantitatively and qualitatively on both the normative and descriptive levels.

3) Monitor the role of religion in public life, adopting a practical approach. How does it present itself in public life? How do new rulers draw inspiration from religion (including negatively as for example incidents of tomb destruction)?

4) Research should examine each of the seven characteristics of the state mentioned in the Muslim Brotherhood's 1994 document. Actions on the ground should be monitored to draw insight from daily realities. This will help us to move away from our over dependence on written sources.

Such actions will allow the IFI to collect enough material to begin substantial analysis on these issues. The IFI should bring together experts, researchers, observers and politicians from Egypt, Syria, Iraq and beyond. In the coming years, there should be enough data to launch critical in depth research projects.

In conclusion, participants agreed that it is crucial that this work is undertaken along with better effort to communicate the outcome to the people and not only the elite. Civil society organizations, students, Institutions, researchers and activists should also be involved along with both traditional and new social media.